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Assistant Professor of Law and Philosophy
My primary research lies in meta-ethics and philosophy of law. In meta-ethics, I defend a heterodox version of quasi-realist expressivism about normative thought and talk. The view is distinctive in its commitments concerning normative supervenience, expressivism's ethical implications, the precise relationship between normative judgment and motivation, and what distinguishes quasi-realism from realism about normativity. The view is motivated based on considerations in moral epistemology. In philosophy of law, I apply the results of meta-normative investigation to practical legal problems. I argue that meta-normative theorizing is crucial for understanding legal rules in American common and constitutional law, including rules govering the differential treatment of normative questions in contract law and tort law, the classification of normative questions that arise at trial as factual, and the scope of juridical obligations to follow the law. I have written, also, on the ethics of legal incentives and the influence of folk metaphysics in criminal law.
I have secondary research interests in general metaphysics, concerning metaphysical dependence, essence, and simple objectivism about the colors.